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Abstract
This paper considers the tensions created in genomic research by public and private for-profit ideals. Our intent is to
strengthen the public good at a time when doing science is strongly motivated by market possibilities and opportunities.
Focusing on the emergence of gene editing, and in particular CRISPR, we consider how commercialisation encourages
hype and hope—a sense that only promise and idealism can achieve progress. At this rate, genomic research reinforces
structures that promote, above all else, private interests, but that may attenuate conditions for the public good of
science. In the first part, we situate genomics using the aphorism that ‘on the shoulders of giants we see
farther’; these giants are infrastructures and research cultures rather than individual ‘heroes’ of science. In this respect,
private initiatives are not the only pivot for successful discovery, and indeed, fascination in those could impinge upon
the fundamental role of public-supported discovery. To redress these circumstances, we define the extent to which
progress presupposes research strategies that are for the public good. In the second part, we use a ‘falling giant’
narrative to illustrate the risks of over-indulging for-profit initiatives. We therefore offer a counterpoint to commercialised
science, using three identifiable ‘giants’—scientists, publics and cultures—to illustrate how the public good contributes
to genomic discovery.
Keywords: Public good, Public interest, CRISPR, Solidarity, Benefit sharing, Ethics in genomic research, Human genome
project, Biobank
Introduction
Cutting-edge bioscience is a public good: in addition to
economic benefits, it can generate social value in health-
care, agriculture and industry. Sometimes, however, pre-
occupation with a pecuniary imperative encourages ‘hype
and hope’: predictions that beget idealism and claims
which promise too much. Hyperbole has been a feature of
genomics since its inception, and high hopes continue to
shape perceptions of private interests and the public good.
In this paper, we present an egalitarian-type response to
the entrenchment of commercialisation in genomics re-
search. Using the concept of genomic solidarity, we en-
dorse undertaking research for the public good and
question the current commercial speculation in genomics.
From the Human Genome Project (HGP) [1] as the
flagship project of the ‘Genomic Era’ [2] up to the new
wave of post-genomics research, there has been an over-
arching narrative about the value of high-profile discov-
eries. Most recently, this has been highlighted by gene
editing—a platform of converging scientific expertise
organised around similar methods—and specifically,
CRISPR-Cas9. As we discuss later, these discoveries are
often promoted as the exclusive achievement of processes
of commercialisation. This gratification bias, which creates
pathways for exclusion and validates outlandish (and
sometimes unjustified) rewards for innovators, is at least
partly responsible for the devaluing of the public infra-
structure. On closer inspection of the sophisticated path-
ways of scientific discovery, it becomes clear that in
various ways, the quest for significant returns potentially
jeopardises the ways that the public good contributes to
the production and implementation of scientific know-
ledge. It is, therefore, essential that responsible research in
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genomics and post-genomics include the management of
promises (or ‘promisomics’) [3] which we argue requires
the reification of the public good. We contend that
society-driven research anchored in the public good
should be acknowledged as essential to progress. Refocus-
ing upon the public good could, to some degree, challenge
the culture of hype and hope [4].
The paper is structured in two parts. In the first part, we
situate genomics within a ‘giants’ narrative. In making our
case for the public good, we draw on the work of Robert
Merton, who recounts the Newtonian idea of giants in
science upon whose shoulders others stand [5]. Applying
this to genomics, we argue that the giants are collective
infrastructures and broad research cultures. With these in
mind, we then offer a challenge to market ideologies as
the pivot for successful discovery by emphasising the
extent to which progress presupposes research strategies
that are ‘for the public good’.
In the second part, we build a ‘falling giant’ narrative to
illustrate the risks of over-indulging for-profit initiatives
that come about because of the predominant ideology
that is imposed upon research. That trend has devalued
the public good. Thus, we offer a counterpoint to
marketisation using three ‘giants’—scientists, publics
and cultures—to illustrate how the public good contributes
to genomic discovery.
Giants and genomic technologies
CRISPR-Cas9 (hereafter CRISPR) is the latest highly
prized biotechnology. It is a gene editing tool developed
from bacterial adaptive immunity, based on Clustered
Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats and
‘CRISPR-associated’ enzymes. It is a precise, rapid and
cheap tool for editing DNA that by far outperforms
previous genetic engineering capabilities; it has become
essential in laboratories across the globe. Like the
HGP before, CRISPR promises to revolutionise genetics
and genomics as a quantum advance, and much like the
sequencers who laid the groundwork for next-generation
technologies, it will allow superior analytics to become
available to diverse laboratories [6].1 The emergent gene
editing platform is a switch from the slow but widely
available genetic engineering tools of yesterday, to new,
sharp and shiny ones.
Understanding CRISPR’s place in scientific creativity
and its implications for society can suggest ways in
which technologies are defined by vested interests,
policy goals and public imaginations. In the emerging
landscape of gene editing technology, a number of
themes are re-emerging from past innovations. One of
these themes is the anticipation that technology brings
vast clinical benefits. Before gene editing, the promise of
stem cell science predicted sudden and immediate
prospects—a technology that still envisages immense
progress in areas like regenerative medicine but has yet
to meet expectations. Of ethical concern is the repeated
use of hype and hope to attract funding, promote more
permissive regulations and mislead vulnerable patients
[7]. We do not see this simply as malicious action by
greedy scientists or institutions promoting their invest-
ments (but witness the recent court battles between
scientists and institutions in respect to the CRISPR patents
[8]), nor do we dismiss it as the work of media hunting for
headlines. Rather, it is a feature of the profit-driven constel-
lation whose basic premises we question—their ‘catallactic
bias’ [9]2 towards promoting markets as podiums for pro-
gress without also questioning their unfairness and their
failures, as well as their accomplishments.
A second theme is access to technologies [8]. We may
more generally question the pervasive idea that profit is
not an afterthought to doing worthwhile science, but the
raison d’être. While patents are important in biosciences,
at least according to the socio-economic argument that
they stimulate innovation and investment, critics ques-
tion the effectiveness (and desirability) of monopolies as
incentive models for innovation [10]. To this end, who-
ever successfully receives the rights to CRISPR could
assert to a large extent the still unspecified terms under
which that technology is adopted in laboratories in
clinical, animal and agricultural areas [11]. The conse-
quences of these legal trials could redefine traditional
genetic engineering—that has become an inclusive
platform over the years—in terms of the exclusive con-
text of modernistic gene editing. Critically, patents may
also encourage the kinds of unreasonable dominance
that elevates inventors and privileges investors, while
subordinating public goods. The current landscape of
marketisation as means to discovery and value, might
push valuations of CRISPR-based therapeutics into the
stratosphere of reasonable cost in order to satiate
returns. There, they become out of reach of most includ-
ing insured patients and those dependent on national
health systems. In such circumstances, only the wealthi-
est can be optimistic of benefiting from CRISPR
technologies.
However, rather than focusing on legal and clinical
access conundrums, we want to recast this debate by
using Merton’s narrative about the words famously
uttered by Isaac Newton: Without the giants we would
see nothing; on their shoulders we see farther.3 The first
giants are the individual innovators and inventors and,
in this respect, Newton’s well-known aphorism is an
expression for the dependencies of scientific researchers
on predecessors. In other words, however original the
present endeavour, its success can be traced back to
many prior discoveries. The development of CRISPR
involved many incremental steps, including the discovery
of DNA itself and many contributions since [12, 13].
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Second, there are the giants in contemporary biomedical
research. Scientists increasingly rely on vast networks and
infrastructures, such as big international research consortia,
big machines and big data. It is here that one finds further
significance in the aphorism in respect to the biases of
collaboration (who works with whom and why), particu-
larly in a culture in which being first brings global fame
and (not just monetary) fortune [14].
Third among the giants is the enormous influence of
culture, pegged to the zeitgeist of any particular time;
these might be categorised as neoliberalism, the Anthro-
pocene, populism, post-truth and so on. Gaining cultural
ascendency is significant for scientific discovery: it can
determine what, where and by whom science is done,
and who is acknowledged, compensated and rewarded. In
these times, arguably, science is dominated by neoliberal-
ism, and that involves planning scientific research ultim-
ately to translate discoveries into consumer products and
industrial technology; progress, in this respect, is possible
only because of the ascendency of corporations, competi-
tion and ‘degovernmentalization’ [15]; innovations and
discoveries are celebrated primarily because of their
exceptional contributions to the vast biomedical-market.
As a result, the current CRISPR debate is dominated by
the clinical prospects rather than the undoubted contribu-
tions it will make in many other areas such as animal and
agricultural engineering. However, it is our conjecture that
within all three giants, the real contributions of the public
good are distorted to make the case for marketisation. To
understand how this came about, we need to go back to
the ideologies that grounded the genomic revolution.
Genomics and emerging giants
In 2010, the journal Nature asked whether the ‘genomic
revolution’ had arrived. Contributors to the issue included
the key architects of the HGP, Francis Collins [16] and
Craig Venter [17], whose answers, and those of other con-
tributors, were essentially ‘Not yet’. The reference human
genome dramatically changed the capabilities of genomic
research, yet so far (in 2017), the benefits for individuals
and society have been limited. There remain to date
three grand challenges in genomics: genomics to biology
(elucidating the structure and function of genomes), gen-
omics to health (translating genome-based knowledge into
health benefits) and genomics to society (promoting the
use of genomics to maximise benefits and minimise harms
in populations) [2]. The revolution is progressing more
slowly than many first envisioned; in particular, there is
still some way to go in the translation of genomic science
into widespread clinical applications. It is difficult to pin-
point any one single reason for this [18], but perhaps it is
the right time to consider conceivable flaws in the ideolo-
gies that inform the industry-research complex respon-
sible for undertaking genomic sciences.
The HGP was a moment of high visibility for science
that attracted vast public financing and private entrepre-
neurship4; now, standing on the shoulders of this giant, we
can appreciate discoveries such as CRISPR. Maintaining
momentum in genomics has become the hard sell to
investors and funders, both public and private, so that
waves of hype (and some hope) continue to fluctuate [3].
While technologies become more effective, our dexterity
in managing expectations hardly seems to improve at all;
for genomics, prospects are being transferred to new
initiatives, such as personal and precision genomics [19],
and now, gene editing can be added to that list.
Reflecting on the HGP, Maynard Olson writes:
There are two stories of the Human Genome Project.
One describes a century of scientific progress that
began with the rediscovery of Mendel’s laws in 1900
and ended in a frenzy of genomic sequencing. The
other is a story about contemporary societal
values—particularly those that framed the project’s
endgame and continue to shape public perceptions
towards this defining event in time ([20], p. 931).
The first story alludes to the many giants that enabled
progress in genetics and genomics—all of which surely
contributed, in various ways, to the post-genomic era;
that must include many other confluent technologies
such as computing and data storage. The idea to
sequence the human genome, then, was as much about
historical socio-political events as about the techno-
logical feasibility that would lead to an opportune ‘time
to sequence’ [21].
The second story is about translating genomics into
society. The HGP was characterised by some as a race
between two competing parties—the International Hu-
man Genome Sequencing Consortium (IHGSC) [22] and
Celera Genomics [23]. It is a story that is multi-layered,
involving partisan politics and indiscriminating press
coverage documented in the public-private competition
between the ‘players’ [20]. At the time, two key players
claimed a special connection to the public interest or
good—the public project of IHGSC wanted to publish
their sequences so that it was freely and therefore
widely accessible; Celera argued that it could get the
job done more quickly and save countless human lives
by using intellectual property to generate exclusive
rights and revenue from the human genome [20]. Tak-
ing liberty to distill that rivalry to its most basic point,
two ideologies surface: on the one hand, Venter and
Celera’s interest in sequencing the human genome was
billed as a way to accelerate the laboured efforts of the
public initiative. On the other hand, Collins, praising
the public investment as ‘arguably one of the more im-
pressive success stories… of all time’, recognised the
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implications if the Consortium ‘dropped the ball’ ([24],
p. 60, 80); the only way to assure unrestricted access to
the sequence was to continue with the public project,
perhaps in partnership with other private entities [24].
Thus, it was either a story of mavericks challenging the
slow-witted establishment or a lament about how pri-
vate interests seemed about to capture public goods
[25].5 These competing ideologies persist in bioscience
today, often because of promises and pitfalls of scien-
tific research are created, sustained and leveraged via
ethical and social norms expressed by the leaders in the
field. These opinions echo within complex social and
political networks and are sustained by immense pub-
lic and private infrastructures.
The public good
The response of Collins to Celera’s strategy was to
reaffirm the significance of the public good. What, then,
is meant by the public good?
The Human Genome Organisation (HUGO) has a
long tradition of advocacy for ‘benefit sharing’ to realise
societal as well as economic opportunities [26]. In a
HUGO statement from 2000, it was stated:
A benefit is a good that contributes to the well-being
of an individual and/or a given community. ... Thus, a
benefit is not identical with profit in the monetary or
economic sense. Determining a benefit depends on
needs, values, priorities and cultural expectations…
The HUGO Ethics Committee recommends … that all
humanity share in, and have access to, the benefits of
genetic research [27].
HUGO’s statement, we believe, reflects the public-
private intellectual climate of that time.6 At the outset of
the HGP, it was proposed, and then codified in the 1997
Bermuda Principles, that human DNA sequences ‘should
be freely available and in the public domain in order to
encourage research and development and to maximise
its benefit to society.’
It was agreed that these principles should apply for all
human genomic sequence generated by large-scale
sequencing centres, funded for the public good, in
order to prevent such centres establishing a privileged
position in the exploitation and control of human
sequence information [our emphasis.] [28]
The HUGO Committee on Ethics, Law and Society has
more recently stated that ‘genomic solidarity’ ideally sup-
ports collaborations between individuals, communities
and populations, with research communities and indus-
try [29].7 Significantly, benefit sharing and genomic
solidarity work together through an idea of the public
good [30]. In the most rigorous terms, benefit sharing
suggests that research must be preceded by engagement
with all stakeholders rather than allowing for exclusion
and domination and, consequently, disunity. Relatedly, a
notion of solidarity requires collective agreement upon
common ends to be achieved and how to do so, and
thereby, differentiates between public goods and public
bads. A public good is valued distributively, i.e., to each
and every person that value is secured through equality
of rights. In rights talk, that idea recalls the right to
claim a good (such as food, water or shelter) and affirms
the justified protection of persons’ important interests
(to claim a right is to claim access, protection or
provision of a good). That claim is not limited to the
goods that are traded but includes all goods that estab-
lish a basic level of healthy living and contributes to
opportunities, within egalitarian societies. Public bads do
the opposite: they exist in a way that affect people
distributively (such as pollution spewing into a river
from a factory upstream of a village) and are expressed
in terms of those affected having their rights infringed.
Within a solidary framework, the scope for public goods
to do good and public bads to do the opposite is
understood; institutions and cultures thereby adapt to
priorities that most likely support public goods. In the
context of genomics, the public good means that every-
one is entitled to access to the fruits of research because
that meets HUGO’s ethical conditions for benefit sharing
and solidarity.
The idea of genomic solidarity is likely to be challenged,
for it confronts the engrained idea of public goods as
something which hinders the benefits of economies of
exclusion and rivalry. In that classical estimation, goods
are ‘public’ depending on whether private investment has
any interest in them; in other words, if a good is profitable,
then it is economically wasteful to consider it a public
one. This illustrates what Samuelson originally called
collective consumption goods (what later became known as
‘public goods’) [31]. It leads to a particular view of
goods that can be applied to the human genome: in the
course of human history, every human being, living or
dead, has been part of the genome’s conception (for in-
stance, by adding variants) and contributed to its continu-
ation. Although it is our legacy, no one person has written
the chapters, and sequencers are now ‘reading’ the book
and genomists are ‘translating’ it. This process of curiosity,
understanding and innovation converts the genome from
a status of public legacy to one of value (it is now a chap-
ter or verse that deserves a price), and ownership becomes
a significant factor in that conversion. In short, particles
of, or even the entirety of the genome, have become some-
one’s property [26].
And now, gene editing is likely to extend the interest
in ownership of DNA in the same way that economics
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shaped the claims of ownership of other human mate-
rials [32]. These rewritten or novel sequences will exist
outside of any normal or representative human genome.
Thus, it is more likely than ever that human genes will
become commodities [33], and society will have to
decide how tolerable such claims are to be in light of the
alleged benefits of a flourishing gene market. It is in this
context that we find HUGO’s benefit sharing model and
genomic solidarity as a challenge to uncritical characteri-
sations of human genomic commodities. In the next
section, we use the narrative of giants to explain the
public’s role in genomics, the pitfalls of profit-driven
science, and to thereby strengthen the conception of the
public good.
Giants and the public good
How do CRISPR and other gene editing tools become an
opportunity for the public good? We now explore in
greater detail the ‘giants’ metaphor; a term which not
only means ‘greater than normal’ but also refers to ways
that people who are exceptional in talents and abilities
contribute to ideal conditions for discovery. There are
three giants: (1) individuals with great creativity and
insight involved in the development of the technology
(not just the inventors but also the policy makers, politi-
cians and administrators who will create the regulatory
conditions in which gene editing occurs); (2) institutions
of great size and reach, where research is housed and ap-
plications transpire; and (3) the prevailing zeitgeist,
namely the cultures that exert influence in this area of
research.
Individuals as giants
The prevailing social narrative of CRISPR concerns the
first of our giants: inventors pitted against one another
in conjunction with their lawyers and administrators
[34]. As a result of this perspective, there is a tendency
to think about cutting-edge technologies only in terms
of economics, thus venerating scientists for their endeav-
ours within systems that primarily promote profit [35].
However, from the observation that clustered repeats
might be significant, to CRISPR’s sensational harnessing
and refining, it involved, as with nearly all other discov-
eries, many scientists, working for many years on many
topics [36]; CRISPR’s discovery, therefore, is contentious
in respect to the ‘giants’ metaphor. On the one hand, a
legal narrative prompts us to focus excessively on
isolated contributions attributable to individuals; on the
other hand, that approach disavows the extent to which
novelty builds on vast networks of knowledge and
technology that are already in place. This understanding
of discovery is also relevant in respect to technology’s
translation into applications and useful products [36]. In
this respect, we might ask whether the gene editing
platform should be a public resource by acknowledging
multiple contributions.
Our premise is that the links of discovery are much
wider that is currently appreciated by the legal narrative.
Rather than standing in isolation, scientists, their affili-
ates and institutions rely on publics who volunteer their
time, bodies and experiences for clinical trials, become
patient-participants in research through their giving of
data and tissue samples, and have interests by way of
meeting their tax obligations (that are spent on industry
partnerships and subsidies). Science, therefore, con-
sumes enormous amounts of public time and resources;
its progress is felt through the flow of capital, user prod-
ucts, and necessary oversight and regulation. It is be-
cause of these factors that scientists are accountable to
publics: the public good, therefore, refocuses progress
upon what the public needs, or expects, from invest-
ments in bioscience. These arguments become more
pressing when the technology is as significant as poten-
tially gene editing is. If science is answerable to the pub-
lic, then there might be an expectation that there are
good reasons for commodification. In that case, argu-
ments for the exclusivity for CRISPR might be conten-
tious because of the public interest in public goods and
the ways in which markets cause mischief in this respect:
the patterns of hype and hope and limited access con-
tribute in ways that are public bads. The public good re-
quires a revaluation of progress so that science justifies
investment and rewards, by maximising social progress
via promoting pathways in which better medicines lead
to better health, and those benefits are reasonably ac-
cessible. For instance, perhaps by acknowledging the
interdependent paths of thought and discovery, we
would become more prudent when rewarding serendip-
itous discoveries, and, moreover, question industries that
often require secrecy and delay dissemination [14]. In
these respects, benefit sharing and genomic solidarity ac-
knowledge that discoveries happen, not just because so-
ciety venerates and rewards innovators, but because
their discoveries stand on the shoulders of those that
contribute to worthwhile aspects of society.
Institutions as giants
There are case examples that can usefully show how
marketisation effects social progress. We have already
seen how the architects of the IHGSC believed ap-
proaching the project as a public good was the most ef-
fective way of deciphering the human genome and
making sure it reached as many as possible. Their efforts
are unambiguous in underlining the importance of the
capacity for public innovation, and yet, in the hubbub of
entrepreneurship, the public contribution is easily over-
looked. In fact, because of the HGP, individual innova-
tors stand to benefit from these kinds of gigantic and
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collective knowledge-producing institutions. Thus, we
might think of public research as a broad partnership in
which information is shared between institutions, re-
searchers, participants and publics, and this framework
signifies the importance of the public good in
biosciences.
Examining CRISPR as a broad social phenomenon draws
attention to the kinds of institutions that contributed:
education (high schools, universities), research and train-
ing (research facilities and supervision, as well as public
funders), and security and stability (from sophisticated
enabling infrastructures up to legal systems). These signify
the public infrastructures’ role in innovation. Pierre
Teilhard de Chardin once referred to these giant, global,
intelligent networks as the ‘noosphere’ (derived from the
Greek term νο ς: i.e. ‘mind’ or ‘intellect’) [37]: the world-
wide network of research facilities, discourses, devices,
circuits and repositories. He describes a collective and
distributed web of collaborators, working together in order
to co-create the technologies and insights needed to
address global challenges. In other words, collaboration
and technical and resource dependency is necessary, and
individual achievement is only possible because of these
giant techno-scientific networks. It is apt, then, to recall
these giants as part of the gene editing narrative about the
public good, benefit sharing and genomic solidarity.
When we shift our focus from the innovators to the
research participants, for instance, one perhaps recognises
the importance of other active and ‘passive’ contributors to
science. In this respect, there have been some notable de-
velopments since the outset of the Genomic Era, espe-
cially under the moniker of big data, which segues
logically from the vastness of the human genome. Big data
applies to the creation of extremely large data sets for
computational analysis to generate value [38]; these
data are sourced from vast, indiscriminate methods of
trawling random information for patterns and oppor-
tunities. Others create data within the public commons,
namely, a data repository or resource that is ‘of the
people’ who voluntarily contribute. In respect to the
latter, biobanks have become significant in terms of ac-
tivating public collaborations in ways that are charac-
terised as ‘for the public good’ [25]. This public good
distinction has considerable impact on governance and
the norms that define collection methods and processes
to use resources. A strong sense of the public good
contributes to ‘open science’; conversely, institutions
that are pursuing big data for commercial reasons often
consolidate and conceal their collections. The latter are
the traditional giants of private enterprise, such as the
pharmaceutical industry. Their practices for accumulat-
ing and sharing these data are much different from the
aforementioned public good practices, instead using
private business models rather than public engagement
to appropriate and withhold data [39]. Sometimes, that
business acumen amounts to capture.5
An example of public good capture is illustrated by
the Icelandic deCODE health sector database (qua
biobank). The rise and fall of that biobank is a compli-
cated story of political and scientific intrigue that has
been widely documented [40]. In essence, proponents
for the deCODE biobank claimed there was a public
good in aggregating health records to be used by affili-
ates of the biobank and those purchasing licences.
deCODE had to make the biobank attractive to venture
capitalists; to do so, they realised that ownership of the
data would be necessary. That business strategy was
defended by arguing for a public interest for economic
growth and national revitalisation (i.e. investment in
scientific infrastructure). Many of the data were amassed
legally (after a much debated and enacted law), but with-
out having to obtain the express consent of individuals
in Iceland (who could only opt out).
That strategy was successfully challenged in court [41],
and this proved ultimately a pivotal moment that
exposed the inadequacy of deCODE’s ‘public good-
public interest’ rhetoric. From the outset, the argument
about the public good was doubted by many in the
scientific and medical communities [40]. In defence of
the strategy, ‘The theme of solidarity, through the idea
that deCODE could help keep families together, was
invoked to outweigh abstract notions of autonomy,
patient–doctor confidentiality, and erosion of scientific
integrity’ ([40], p. 89). What the ‘public good’ really
meant to deCODE was the embrace of ‘naive scientific
hype, commercial dominance, and the privatization of
common cultural and scientific resources’ ([40], p. 100).
During the days of the HGP, Celera used similar rhetoric
about the ‘importance of this information to the entire
biomedical research community’; ([20], p. 934) but had
no intention of depositing its sequence data into the
public GenBank database. The company still intended to
restrict public access to their sequence, suggesting that,
as Collins’ predicted, (paraphrasing) perhaps it is not a
sound market strategy to be giving data away for free
([20], p. 935) (also see [24]).
Why is it important to challenge private data acquisi-
tion? Firstly, Collins argued that the fruits of the HGP
should be kept in the public realm because he believed
in facilitating access as widely as possible: the bottom
line was progress through collaboration, rather than pro-
gress by the bottom dollar. He felt discovery would
come from collaboration, and not privatisation and cap-
ture. It is worth pointing out in light of the assumption
that public-based research is antiquated, that the public
IHGSC sequencers not only competed on time and
under budget but also published a more comprehen-
sive genome (Celera’s speed had come with gaps in its
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sequence that had to be filled using the publicly available
data) [1], and, most of all, that success ensured that the
human genome remained in the public sphere. Sec-
ondly, the public good model means that all research-
ers—not just those allied to the IHGSC, Celera,
deCODE affiliates or those willing (or able) to afford
licencing costs—have access. That becomes an inclu-
sive path to progress rather than the narrow trajec-
tory of consumerism: it opens up exploration beyond
profit motivations. Doing so does not morally shut
any doors to profit: venture capitalists would still be
welcome and encouraged to develop products and de-
rivative technologies, but without being allowed a
monopoly on the tools or data.
Consider an exemplar of this model: the UK Biobank.
Its participants are not paid, and they receive few direct
benefits. Research is not prioritised simply because it
likely leads to profit, but it must contribute to the public
good. Half a million people voluntarily and enthusiastic-
ally took part. Why? Perhaps they understood the pur-
pose of the biobank to be about the advantages of
creating a sustainable public resource, and endorsed its
intention to provide inclusive access for the good of all.
In the case of UK Biobank, the Ethics and Governance
Council acts as a ‘steward’ of participants’ data and sam-
ples, and therefore takes a direct responsibility for their
interests [30]. This role is only possible because of a gov-
ernance framework that incorporates participants’ rights
as conceived by the public interest and public good, and
creates a broad steering role for participants through a
vision that is informed by ethics rather than business.
Even so, UK Biobank does recognise ‘reasonable’ pat-
ents, which refers to inventions that are ‘not used to re-
strict health-related research and/or access to healthcare
anywhere in the world.’8 Compare that to deCODE’s
strategy to exploit the enthusiasm of the Icelandic
people or Celera’s mission. Both had begun with overt
economic ideals to capture the public good.
The examples of IHGSC and UK Biobank, we believe,
counter the presumptive folly of public ineptitude, and
indeed illustrate ethically and economically reasonable
arguments to support public goods [42].
The culture of giants
The US National Research Council saw the opportunity
for creating a framework to create, manage and coordin-
ate access to the vast amounts of information generated
from genomics research, but did not state how this was
to happen. Instead, they urged the key players, agencies
and institutions to grow into their roles to avoid stifling
innovation and adaptation [43]. However, developments
in biobanking, where there are clear signs that the public
good can be enhanced for inclusive benefit [44], and the
tempering of patent claims over human genes,9 suggest
the possibilities for securing genomics for the public
good. Capture, in this respect, has a more general dan-
ger: ‘There is a significant risk that if certain commercial
deals are struck or if public access is somehow limited,
there may be a real or perceived sense in which managers
have reneged on an implied promise to advance the
“public good”’ ([45], p. 449). The problem resides in ‘the
corporate skew of the research agenda’ ([45], p. 448).
Capture is also an issue of trustworthiness. Holding insti-
tutions to be trustworthy is far more significant for those
in the public sphere, where publics expect their interests
to be respected (such as privacy), than those clear about
the priorities of their own private pursuits (like commer-
cialisation) [46, 47]. This can be explained by different sets
of values or cultures on display by public and private insti-
tutions [30], just as the public good (as we have argued)
does not always mean the same thing to an ethicist as it
does to an economist.
As we have defined it, the public good means that
stakeholders may not agree ultimately on the goal (or
fate) of research in terms of shared benefit and solidar-
ity. In this vein, it was written about biobanks that ‘com-
peting, but ultimately compatible, interests’ of multiple
agents often find they share values ([48] p. 9). We would
disagree: it might be better said that conflicts between
public and private are not inexorable but are culturally
engrained; compatibility should certainly not be assumed,
and, in fact, scepticism seems warranted.6 The chief dan-
ger is a misconstrued narrative about the public good that
conceals a reluctance to be critical of business approaches
(or to be less than appreciative of public ones). This is, of
course, also a comment on the role of private and state in-
terests in innovation, and the controversial aspects of
expanding or shrinking the role of government in
innovation (e.g. basic science, research and development)
that go beyond the focus of this paper [49].
Instead, our message is short: one should challenge
superficial explanations that hold to the benefits of
markets without being critical of the processes—even
injustices—that are involved [9]. In a culture that does
not question such assumptions, there are clear trade-
offs, as Olson speculates, ‘Perhaps science has assimi-
lated the mores of the “new economy” a bit too readily’
([20], p. 941). We have given examples of the achieve-
ments possible when not driven by financial gain; these
accomplishments challenge the assumptions about pub-
lic inefficiencies. Regardless, these assumptions continue
to be carefully and advantageously communicated to
convince others that innovation is driven by profit. In
reality, the public infrastructure is not only essential, but
ultimately able to compete, accelerate, and achieve.
In this regard, the rhetoric of hype or hope may be
driven by questionable short-term gains (such as a pa-
tient’s vulnerablity for a last chance cure), but one
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should also question the significance of vested interests
when a new, expensive drug is marketed to a deliberately
impoverished health system. These must be challenged
in the context of the long-term damages to socio-
political elements rooted in the public sphere.
We caution, therefore, the erosion of the public good
that produces, conserves, and preserves resources for
current and future generations. The public good may
substantiate ideas such as ‘open science’—one scheme in
this regard is presented by Maynard Olson in this issue
of Human Genomics, in which ‘investigators and small
laboratories tap directly into a truly communal resource’
as an alternative to the tendency to build (and the con-
notations of ) research behemoths. Our model of gen-
omic solidarity supports this sentiment, although giant
infrastructures can be welcomed, and to a degree, are
inescapable when studying large publics because ‘com-
munal’ is defined as providing information to publics but
also inviting them to take part en masse as individually
informed participants. A public bad leaves scope for
secrecy or hype-oriented misinformation; and is bound
to discourage participation, and instead the public be-
come subjects. The public good, then, creates space for
engagement and information dissemination; and requires
an obligation for truthful claims, honest brokering and
research integrity. Researchers in both big and more
modest institutions equally are bound by the same soli-
darity. In this respect, if these giants fall—the active
structures that support public science—then so would
its contributions to the public commons and scientific
method. Instead, researchers focused on the shared
ideals of Merton’s principles of transparency, objectivity,
disinterest and scepticism, will be forced into the private
vision of ‘interested enquiry’ and ‘secret knowledge’ [14].
Merton’s principles are still fundamental to the way in
which the dialogue between the science complex and so-
ciety occurs, and they are necessary to ensure that re-
search programmes evolve in a way that societal needs,
expectations and concerns can be addressed, and bene-
fits can be produced. It is likely that in market-obsessed
environs, scientific integrity becomes eroded. Moreover,
market priorities particularly affect the ways in which re-
search endeavours are disseminated to colleagues and
publics [50]. We therefore challenge prevailing neo-
liberal ideas and suggest that continuation of these strat-
egies may evermore rely on hype and hope. Ultimately,
that likely will undermines public infrastructure and, in-
evitably, the cost will be public trust.
Conclusion
While legalisation has tended to dominate social com-
mentaries about CRISPR, we have explored the role of
other ‘giants’ as key players in the innovation of gene
editing. In so doing, we have examined the biomedical
research complex comprising individuals, institutions
and cultures. Although multiple disassociated visions of
social, legal and fiscal reality thrive within this complex,
the question for us has been whether these separate
visions of discovery evoke one ethical paradigm that out-
classes another. We do not conceive of our world as one
in which markets should be entrusted with making im-
portant decisions. Rather, we acknowledge the extent to
which market players remain fundamentally dependent
on public infrastructures and previous efforts made by
(often anonymous, often public) others. An enquiry is
urgently required to see whether forgoing these contri-
butions through marketisation could in fact stifle or
already has stifled progress.
The current world is one in which both public and
private players have their place, and their supporters and
detractors. If there is such a thing as an ideal commu-
nity, there is unlikely to be a single guiding vision of
innovation. However, careful study of the specific incre-
mental contributions of individuals, institutions and net-
works within science, and how social and economic
ideals affect them, will allow us to articulate the values
that lead to truly prosperous science—not just economic
gains, but also the augmentation of discoveries that may
fundamentally change peoples’ lives. CRISPR is already a
technical ‘disruptor’ [51]. We should consider now how
its potential should be turned into a ‘health dis-
ruptor’. Otherwise, it may become another an unrealised
promise, another invention encumbered by hype and
hope. In this respect, public interest rhetoric is entangled
with market agendas and, arguably, still dominates the
ways in which many parties think about doing successful
research—yet, the examples of UK Biobank and the
IHGSC, used here, should be a warning to those acquies-
cent to that stilted dogma.
In the end, the single, major giant that supports
biomedical sciences, including genomics, is ‘the public’
or, realistically, a constellation of all publics. We have
articulated the concept of the public good as a solidary,
a community that finds it worthy to protect the shared
interests of research. This is what HUGO meant when it
articulated ‘genomic solidarity’, with the public and
scientists as joint owners in discovery and opportunity [29].
If genomic research becomes infused with the public
good—one in which participants and scientists stand to-
gether for a common purpose that benefits humanity—then
that is something to nurture to provide a viable and sus-
tainable alternative to purely commercial research.
Here, our aim has been to open up avenues for delib-
eration for progress in genomic research. What is
required now is a differential investigation into the roles
of public and private efforts to create and translate basic
science into public benefits via a ethical framework that
does not instigate hype and hope as a ‘tried and trusted’
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mechanism to drive innovation. There are a number of
challenges for translating genomics for the public good,
which can be brought together under three headings:
1. Conceptual—How can these challenges be practically
framed within a conception of the public good?
2. Scientific—How can this framework create trust,
promote progress and encourage investment in
science?
3. Political and social—How can different agents
(private and public) work within, and promote the
goals of, this framework?
It is important, however, not only to investigate these
issues and how they can be addressed but also to exam-
ine the indicators of scientific success (metrics) and the
mechanisms that best reward fruitful research. The
concept of genomic solidarity allows us to measure the
extent to which genomics is or can be harnessed for the
public good, so that both the public and the scientists
share the benefits and opportunities.
Endnotes
1The first human draft genome cost at ‘least $500
million’, and a genome sequence in 2016 was below
$1000); see https://www.genome.gov/sequencingcosts/
2Heath’s reference is to the term ‘catallaxy’ used by
Friedrich Hayek (via Ludwig von Mises) to describe
spontaneous market order that would come about
between different economies. In effect, Hayek believed
that trade is fundamentally a pattern of mutually bene-
ficial interactions
3Paraphrasing from Umberto Eco’s ‘Dicebat Bernardus
Carnotensis’, foreword in: [5] p. pxiii
4See https://www.genome.gov/sequencingcosts/
5Capture is the tendency for ‘private interests’ to
appropriate public goods for their market value. It
explains how market disinterest in worthless goods
becomes a newfound interest, often by way of a spark
that ignites a flurry of profiteering hubbub. A public good
suddenly becomes a marketisation imperative. It might be
as simple as turning a public road into a toll road; or as
complex as sequencing a (very long) reference genome
and claiming that being the first to do so rightly transfers
ownership of the ‘human genome’ [25]
6Knoppers, the then Chair of the HUGO Ethics
Committee, suggested that patents would not be incom-
patible with ‘common heritage’ as long as consent and
contracts were valid. Below, we discuss one of the exam-
ples used by Knoppers to strengthen our difference to her
claim, noting that in fact deCODE’s efforts, rather than
justifying ‘moving beyond historical distrust’ of industry
[26], became an example of why scepticism and suspicion
are well placed
7UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and
Human Rights (2005): Article 13—solidarity and cooper-
ation: ‘Solidarity among human beings and international
cooperation towards that end are to be encouraged’
8Section 3.8. The Biobank’s Access Procedures also
offer up a remedy: if ‘UK Biobank considers that an
Unreasonable Restriction exists or is likely to exist, then
it shall promptly notify the Applicant, and automatically,
on receipt of such notification, the Applicant shall be
deemed to grant a perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide,
fully paid-up, royalty-free, fully sub-licensable licence to
UK Biobank to use such Applicant-Generated Invention
in order to remove or mitigate the Unreasonable Restric-
tion’; (s. B8) http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2011/11/Access_Procedures_Nov_2011.pdf
9See Myriad case: cDNA could be patented, but not
human genomic DNA in its natural form; Assoc. for Mo-
lecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 569 U.S. (2013).
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